
PHILOSOPHY OF GLOBAL ISSUES

THE REAL EXISTING REAL REALITY 2022. ARTICLE TWO. FROM THE SELF-DESTRUCTIVE SOCIETY TO THE DESTRUCTION OF THE OTHERS OR THE SELF-DESTRUCTIVE THREE SOCIETIES WORLD GOES TO WAR

Endre Kiss

University Eötvös, Budapest, Hungary

The present study 'The Real Existing Real Reality 2022' consists of two related articles. These are reflections on societies, and perhaps the world, on the way to self-destruction. The author wanted to add a subtitle to the article 'The Three-quarter Time Waltz of Self-Destructive Society, the New Social Structure of Three Societies and a War, in Which Good Can at least Fight against Evil'.

In this work we discuss the currently urgent issue of how to interpret the rapidly increasing peaceful and non-peaceful transformations in the definitive global world. We point out the common features of the current events. Our title (The Real Existing Real Reality 2022) goes back to Boris Ponomarev's phrase about the 'real existing socialism', which should have been higher than all 'utopian' concepts. All references to 'reality' seem to have two different directions. In the first case, 'reality' is more valuable than utopias (as in Ponomarev). In the second case, reality is poor and negative compared to ideas. But we are actually dealing with a third case. 'Reality' becomes for as the highest value, because the possession of the definition of Reality becomes the real goal of the present war.

In the first article, 'From the Victory of Neo-Liberalism to the Self-Destructive World Society', we have shown the 'real' process and not yet reflected political and social transformations.

In this second, article, 'From the Self-Destructive Society to the Destruction of the Others or the Self-Destructive Three Societies World Goes to War', we show that the replacement of the unipolar world by the multipolar world is not a metaphysical necessity, and that this replacement can take place in several ways. However, the ways in which it then takes place again depends on people who, especially under the circumstances of globalization, for objective and structural reasons, can ascend to become powerful actors. The connec-

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tion between our theory of Globalization and the actual war between Russia and Ukraine lies in the actorial side of the real globalization. This actorial side has changed in a tragic way. It was the world-historical change between 2001 and 2003/2004, it is the imperial turn of the globalization of 1989. This war is the direct but by no means necessary or metaphysical consequence of the imperial turn. It is an imperial war that is definitely alien to the essence of globalization.

Keywords: logic of difference, otherness, imperial globalization, Third Way, global actors, fundamentalism, post-communist transformation, war nihilism, new quality of propaganda.

On February 24, 2022, the Russian–Ukrainian war began, which continues daily to escalate step by step. From the very beginning, the war was under propagandistic pressure of a kind not seen since the real Cold War. From the very beginning, the war had a total character, in which not just the vocabulary, but the whole dictionary was completed in advance. *The neoliberal culture of political correctness dialectically turned into its opposite.* It became totalitarian. One side emphasizes the current border crossing of the other side, the other side emphasizes the long series of previous consistent border crossings of the other side. Both are right, the democratic public consciousness is expected to take a stand for one border crossing against the other. This constellation is a deliberate attempt to take back the achievements of globalization with a claim to finality (again in the sense of Thomas Mann's 'withdrawal of the *Ninth Symphony*'). This war itself is a living (also 'real') *counter-revolution against real globalization* and the spirit of 1989.

On the Historical Concept of the West

In general, you can think a lot about the West, and in fact we have thought a great deal about it. In the shadow of the 'downfall(s) of the West' (Untergang des Abendlandes), which praises modernity, it has become clear that the 'West' was indeed the *key concept* of the twentieth century that replaced the earlier key concepts such as *Christianity*, or *modernity*, or *socialism*, or *Europe*. After 1989, the West was the potentiated center of the world. The best of all worlds, the greatest outcome and the eternal goal and unavailable dream of other non-Westerners. *The West was the real utopia.* The West was democracy, prosperity and the highest culture, with, at the same time, the guarantee that democracy, prosperity and culture would still rise even higher and become accessible to all under favorable circumstances.

No doubt, this West was a *mythology* that had nothing to do with rational reality. However, mythology did not arise *without reason*. It was already mythology in the sense of everyday language. But it was also mythology in the sense of *Georges Sorel*, exactly in the sense that *Sorel's mass strike* was a mythology. It is a myth that certainly did not arise in a random way, but that does not change its mythical character. This myth does not originate in any epoch from the self-sufficient image of a positive West, *but rather from the permanent comparison with the Real East.* Some differences between the Real East and the Real West have been transferred or to the West as a myth. This West was the clear product of a *false consciousness*. This false consciousness itself

proved to be a repository of true facts, personal experiences, historical prescriptions and unpleasant longings. In a more 'understanding functioning' of our interest in knowledge, we do not ask directly about the 'status' of the West in our consciousness; in understanding, we ask *what the reasons for these ideas were*. In fact, there are many reasons. The business of 'understanding' proves to be productive. One first understands everything 'cognitively' or 'intellectually', then one possibly understands everything psychologically and/or even emotionally. One can understand everything, but understanding is not *just* a logical and *only* cognitive category. The more and more, more and more deeply we understand something that is wrong, the more empathy we have for wrong attitudes, the more tragic and thus also more insoluble the concrete situation itself becomes. *It is important not to confuse empathy with judgement under any circumstances.*

About the Non-Western-Peace

And the West actually behaved resembling a myth. After 1989, but especially after 2003/2004, it acted and broke its own incommensurable identity. The historical concept of the West ceased to exist. Long and complex investigations will be necessary to examine even the truth of this historical concept. The concept of the West was not directly based on Western reality. It was based on the art and civilization of the West and the even greater barbarism of the non-Western regions. These were the two real moments that distinguished the West: so on the one hand, it was the *aesthetic refinement* that aroused admiration in others, and on the other hand, the *perception of a difference* in the danger of physical and political life. *What was not 'West' was considered barbaric.*

However, a *painful picture* of history opens up here before us. This overall historical picture is composed of two life situations. What was not 'West' *usually* lived better and, above all, more *peacefully* and *happily* than the West, hence the countless nostalgic memories of all the peripheries of the western center of Czernowicz to Agadir. However, the *Non-Western Peace* was always at risk, these peoples and regions could suddenly face the greatest catastrophes almost without transition. *The true paradigm*, then, was this: that much of the periphery lived more peacefully and happily than the Western center, but their existence was in fact threatened to a greater extent without a transition to life and death, while the existence of the West was spared from these types of upheavals, although in reality it could never live in such peaceful and happy harmony as the periphery during normal times.

Thus, the concrete civilizational difference in favor of the West is true and false at the same time. The true reality was divided quite asymmetrically, which could also contribute to the consolidation of ideological images and prejudices. *The periphery* (the Eastern man) lived well when peace was given to him, but he often lost this peace and then suddenly he had to confront the worst. *The center* (the Western man) always lived hard, had to fight more, but was usually not forced to look such annihilations in the eye. After all, the *East-West divide* that dominated the twentieth century is anything but a thoroughly researched object. In general, a very vague and ill-defined opposition can also be perceived: *the West several times felt strong enough to attack the East directly and enslave it in some way, while the East never, in a clear way, had these inclinations.* But we know that this fact did not disturb the picture of the East from Attila to Putin at all.

At this analytical level, the East certainly did not want to destroy the West militarily as often as the cultivated West wanted to destroy the East. The ideological images and prejudices, however, proclaimed with great determination the *direct opposite* of this reality. To this day, the West should always be afraid of Eastern barbarism, which has not prevented it from actually attacking the East with all its powers. The East was supposed to honor and love the West, and it never occurred to it that it was destroying the real West. In practice, it was a double victory for the West, its constant aggression was rewarded by the reverent veneration of the East. Therefore, you can see how *unfounded* even the most important 'ruling ideas' in this debate are.

The current war abolishes the historical concept of the West. That is the reality. However, we do not know what the tenor of the ideological images and prejudices will be. After all, we follow the maxim that one *must first believe one's own eyes*, which is not only becoming more and more difficult in the poisonous and obscene enemy image formation of today's propaganda, but also sometimes a privilege or already even a *luxury*. The terror of opinion wafts every day, the pressure on the Westerner wafts, he slowly needs important courage to believe his own eyes.

There was once a West, there is no West today. The West 'no longer sets' (Untergang, Spengler), there is no sunset, there is a perpetuated solar eclipse. Maybe even the night. The West is not reborn, the analysis says. However, what remains of the West as a memory or some other virtual form of existence is not known. One cannot rule out that a virtual West with *Mona Lisa* and *Jean Jacques Rousseau* can enchant a few more generations, and then in the concentrated processing of the media industry and by virtue of Aldous *Huxley's* bliss pills, they will actually think that the West still exists and that they live in this West. But people who believe their own eyes will know that the West is no longer emerging.

Recently, the traits of *Hermann Broch's* 'happy apocalypse' (fröhliche Apokalypse) have not been missing. Some features of the *dancing Titanic* also appeared. However, *the really essential was something actually completely new*. After 1989, the West fell into the hands of an anti-communist – neoliberal elite (the *first* society, in the sense of the first part of our experiment). It could be sure of its political power, and, what is more, for a long time it was also widely publicly recognized. In this extremely consolidated situation, the evil psychological motivations of this elite gradually took over. A certain amorality ('*who else exists but us?*') began to become characteristic of them. It went so far that the political goals of this elite often corresponded to their own concrete (mainly 'personal') economic and moral interests.

Don't be Afraid of Your Own Population

The visible (let us not forget: 'visible to those who can muster the courage to trust their own eyes') gravitational direction of the new elites (the *first* society) draws attention to the fact that this new elite *is no longer afraid of its own population*, presumably it no longer needs to listen to it. The unprecedentedly irrational and self-destructive attitude for migrants against their own society speaks for itself. And perhaps the new elite can afford to stop being afraid of its own poor, oppressed and insulted. For the identification with this elite around 1989, the do-gooders, the language regulations, the loss not only

of intellectual, but also of the practical and political alternatives, the new windowlessness of today's masses, the pampering through enjoyment, light drugs, mass communication, the growing problems of this population in surviving daily worries, the new fears, *etc.*, are all elements of a constellation that made this predominant position of power possible. The end result, however, is clear (though not understandable): the new elite after 1989 had no reason to be afraid of its own population in a traditional sense, *i.e.*, of its own people. *And it ultimately explains everything that could not be explained in other ways.* A prime example is that in the first weeks of the military conflicts it was assumed with conviction that the Russian people would rebel against Putin. However, it has not yet been said that the 'Western' populations could rebel not only against this war, but also against the lack of energy. After 1989, the individual can no longer be found in the West. He thanks for the question of his well-being, he is doing well, but he is doing well even when he is not well. *The kings passed over such peoples*, for he will be well under all circumstances. Bertolt Brecht was wrong to assume that power cannot replace the people; it can do so. On the one hand, power, like in the political elite, has gained a great deal. On the other hand, however, the same power also accumulated the greatest imaginable danger. *Without the reactions of the people, it loses the possibility of correcting an incorrect political line.* And indeed, one cannot currently imagine at all that a Western political line could be publicly questioned. Later historians, who talked about this military conflict with their Ph.D., must also think about this element.

Niklas Luhmann as the Base and the Human Rights (Menschenrechte) as the Superstructure (Überbau), or on the Finality of Western Europe

It should now be made clear that what Western Europe is today, how it is organized, what its potential for hypocrisy is, and whether, as Western Europe, it even has its own goals.

When reconstructing the problem of goals, one must always concentrate on the basic essentials. On paper, Western Europe has many 'ideal' goals. But it does not have an ideal goal in the sense that it would have to do something every day to achieve it, so that this achievement would not be one hundred per cent identical with its own current interests. By 'interests' we mean decidedly 'particular', *i.e.*, egoistic interests. *The real goal of Western Europe does not exist.* The real goal remains to *take advantage* of the real situation, and the real situation is aimlessness. Western Europe will soon be a bridge to Russia and will soon want to destroy it. *Soon it dies for Schäuble's 'black zero'; soon it shoots the money for everyone and in all directions. Soon it fights for the clean energy of the nuclear reactors; soon it destroys them in one day because a certain politician has changed their mind. Soon it kisses all the migrants; soon it increases the pressure on them. Soon it will be 'Rhenish' (proud!); soon 'neoliberal' (also proud!). Soon it works out a system of new elections of the leading administrators; soon it chooses the leading person in a completely different way (Weber, Timmermans and Schulz could sing their songs about this). Soon a party system will work; soon it will not (if a populist just gets a little stronger).* The only thing that is stable is permanent instability.

At this point, we need to briefly specify the context in which we have so far been talking about the European finality. We now have the steely context that Europe is currently acting against its own values, which have been so generously associated with it until now (it is now a secondary question that *Joschka Fischer-Habeck-Baerbock-Greens* do this with explicit references to European values, it is undoubtedly interesting, but contingent in its full absurdity). Europe's finality, or the multiple shortcomings of this finality, can then be discussed individually (assuming that a 'deficiency' can be called many times at all). In fact, Europe has not announced any universal (or million-dollar) goals, and its Luhmannian functionality actually excludes such goals. The situation is hardly any different with regard to 'practical' goals. Luhmann's functioning of Europe is based on optimality, which cannot always be adhered to because of the various political deals. 'Goals' are generated, mostly from the ambiguities that always arise from the political double structure and are completely unavoidable, which the press then presents in a very abbreviated manner and serves up not as a structural reality, but as a personal deviance, which must be disciplined in the spirit of European liberality. Europe's failed debt policy against Greece went through, Greece proved to be a deviant that had to be punished. This example is the crisis itself. The part of bad European politics (with its many secret interest components) is simply forgotten. The pretense is that Greece is a black sheep that must be disciplined by its good aunt in its own best interests!

Europe's aimless functioning is also a movement, even if it takes place in a vacuum. Every movement takes different positions. There are opportunities (!) that you want to exploit embarrassingly and pettishly. Only very briefly do we look over into that other dimension, that of Europe, which is deeply bitter in this functionalist machine-like nature, even for those for whom it was created and who still really want to elevate it and definitely save it. Such actors are the creative entrepreneurs, the creative people, the workers and all those who demand transparent relationships and consistency. Thus, after the macabre *Brexit*, there are also many other articulations of leaving the Union.

We raised the question of the finality of the European Union (EU) in a very specific concrete context. We did not want to raise the holistic historical and theoretical question: the Union arose in a different concrete historical context in the spirit of *Niklas Luhmann's* functionalist system theory with very strictly prescribed conditions. The finality of the Union during this period is now secondary, because during the entire subsequent development following 1989, the Union has largely failed to comply with the conditions it conceived and prescribed for. In these circumstances, should the question of finality be asked at all? If, of course, the EU had a finality before 1989 and gave it up after 1989, it is almost misleading to ask the question of a finality at all. Thus, bypassing a history of several decades (such as the history of the introduction of the Euro), we have no choice but to discuss the fact that the EU could more or less adhere to the original principles internally (internally, *i.e.* in the direction of its own institutions), while it did not simply compromise externally (*i.e.* in the direction of the other major powers and institutions in globalization), but did not even declare itself as a global player. However, all this barely contributed to the creation of a true finale. Thus, the West fell into a veritable web of ambivalence. It concealed its real powerlessness behind a super-

identification that led it *ad absurdum* both with American goals and with the American *world view* (which, of course, no longer had much to do with European goals). Nonetheless, the downfall of the West also involves a certain egoism that can hardly be called otherwise. In the absence of finality, and in the renunciation of its own identity, the West (a part of the West that pretended to be the whole EU and the whole West) wanted to get certain expectations of concrete economic and other advantages out of this concrete and subordinate situation (*progressive green industry as 'big business'!*). We spoke earlier about 'outside' and 'inside' in the way we imagine Europe. However, this includes the fact that long before *Brexit*, the 'domestic European greats' not only did not give up their own nation-state interests, but also consciously expanded them (*Siemens, e.g., forgot at the time that China is communist and does not belong to the EU; England made countless woundable films about English history, probably with EU funds*).

From the Downfall also Two?

Much can be said about the year 1989, under one. From a specific point of view, however, it was in any case *an unprecedented event*. In the stream of a dissolving bipolar world, the West remained alone on the stage of power. It was left alone, it was free; it was free to shape freedom and it was correspondingly free in the further unfolding of the deeper threads of its history. In analyzing the behavior of the West in this extremely singular situation, however, we are immediately confronted with a methodological question. That the West *is divided* (not without history, but it is not so relevant at the moment). This division proved to be a crucial fact, but it remained not only essentially unknown until the end, but equally ambivalent.

The year 1989 brought America and Western Europe into a single camp. It was not only a strategic necessity, but also the *inertia* effect of the past that had just come to an end. The West, as one unit, remained alone on the stage after Gorbachev had withdrawn everything that constituted the Soviet Union, Real Socialism and the bipolar world. The West, acting as a unit, also has the opportunity to act and to act uniformly. In many ways it has actually done so, in many ways it has not. It can be said that the non-implementation of a new order of international politics is also the *focus* from which one can understand everything later. In fact, this unthought-through project was already the fruit of this strange division of the West. After 1989, this West had one significant and extreme advantage. It appeared 'together' against the remnants of the East and the Third World, spreading a long-serving legend for the other parts of the world. At the beginning of the 1990s, the author of these lines experienced a situation in Hungary in which this was clearly manifested. A well-behaved economist, who regularly dealt with strategic issues and was correspondingly more populous, gave an exposé in which it was clear that he considered the USA and the EU to be a single and common subject. So, was there a West? Or two? In fact, this question has another set of strategic consequences that could be exploited very productively and have had many effects. At this point, we would highlight a single dimension. The 'first' downfall of the West applies in the literal sense of the word. If one understands Western Europe by 'Occident', then

the game is over. This Occident perished; Big Brother swallowed it up before our days, in the wake of the Ukrainian war directed by Zelensky in *franchise*.

But it is by no means the only decline. The 'second' decline is currently befalling the USA. In part, certainly not only because of this war, but because of the comically misguided policies since the Iraq war in 2002/2004. This would mean that it was (*W.*) *Bush* himself who carried out this assassination attempt on the US West. With this thesis one can finally calm down: appearances are not deceptive! The hypothesis that this man (in two terms of office) would put the US into the grave, was not only plausible, but it also proved to be correct. Among other things, he directed the expansion of NATO alongside *Condoleezza Rice*. The 'second' (and it coincides with the 'first') decline of the West is therefore, in plain language, the downfall of the world's former sole superpower. This 'second decline has been proved many times; here we would only like to point out the *internal situation* of the country, as well as the nature of its warfare. We know that this is not a complete analysis, but its indicative truth must also be obvious. The benefits of this turn seem to be evident. For a psychoanalyst, this turn reveals the secret jealousy of the Americans for the ideological homogeneous and mythologized power existence in the former Soviet Union.

The signs and facts of the West's permanent decline are filling the media as planned. News agencies such as *Amnesty International* apologizing because one of their reports was negatively commented on Ukraine is hardly noticed. This is precisely what is new, amusing and dangerous. *Everyone apologizes to Zelensky*. And the talented artist, who has been on stage all his life, knows exactly how to decipher this situation and exploit it effectively (even if you don't believe he is alone and only in the spotlight because of his talent). Zelensky realized that the West, to put it more precisely, *Western society* is no longer capable of acting (another 'decline' of the many, by the way). *You can do whatever you want with this Western society, with its peacemakers, churches, Popes, free-thinking intellectuals, radical champions, former leftists (in the majority). And Zelensky did and does it*. He plays with this Western society like a cat with a mouse, he becomes linguistically brutal, arrogant, he sometimes uses the clear language of obscene *contempt*. For a moralist, it is very instructive to think from time to time whether Russian society will not rebel against Putin. However, we have not yet been able to find a press release that has thought about the fact that Western society could rebel against the events. Another sign of doom. Another press agency sees it as its duty to add a propagandistic 'red tail' to information that is perfectly clear. It was about the alleged North Korean troops who would willingly fight alongside the Russians. The performance-savvy press agency adds in all concrete terms that one should not believe that these North Koreans are real volunteers, *because they are not really voluntary*. Who is told that? Has there been a single person who has regulated the North Korean military formations for volunteers? Why use this empty tautology of propaganda to print some juicy, negative judgments about the opponent? Have you lost all the standards of reality? By the way, the loss of reality is much clearer in small things than in the big ones, because the big ones always enjoy the advantages of a comprehensive position that no one can control. Or is the truth actually different here? Do the editors think, for example, that people should already be mentally diminished to such an extent that some

spontaneously think that these volunteers are truly volunteers? Well, as far as the reduction of the mental abilities of the broader population groups is concerned, everything is again possible...

Decline follows decline. The incumbent President of Germany (Frank-Walter Steinmeier) is undesirable, he apologizes and is also well-behaved. The incumbent Chancellor of Germany is called 'liver sausage', which he takes as true criticism disguised as humor and of course apologizes. Many consider in themselves, 'liver sausage' – and they are not entirely wrong...After all, *everyone apologizes to Zelensky*. This permanent decline does not distort language and semantics to such an extent that would have been physically or cognitively unimaginable a year ago. Feelings and emotions also move, the inhibitions of civilization are dismantled, classic 'blood libels' fly in the air. The complete annihilation of the other comes into the dictionary. One proposes to make the other disappear from the map and to exclude it from all institutions and contacts in which it is only possible. The good fights against the evil, the individual parties criminalize each other already at the beginning of each action. The good fights against evil, these labels spread like wildfire in no time, the language control reaches new totalitarian heights. Individuals from the other side are even treated as criminals (a good question for philosophers and moralists about how this extreme political label relates to reality – who is really a criminal and who is not). Possessions are confiscated (we do not think this happened even during the Second World War, but we could be wrong). This situation is really unique, one would like to say 'priceless'. No one sympathized with the Soviet-post-Soviet oligarchy that bought thick portions from the state (and social) common property of the former Soviet Union to the West, and from one point onward considered his own portion to be his own fortune. But now it will also be possible to illegally defend against these oligarchs, but this is 'dialectics on the highest level', or, as Marx was called, 'the expropriators are expropriated'.

From the Ukrainian side, there are always new proposals as to who else should be criminalized. These noises are simply inexhaustible in the creativity of hatred. During the *bombardments*, they point their fingers at peoples or ethnic groups that should be excluded from the cycle of civilization once and for all. And they may know that our 'Western world', with its human rights and Grotius, usually follows these monological cues. The political perversion and obscenity break through all dams, the drug consumption of the soldiers rises far beyond the threshold of the dutifully prescribed doubt. Not only do 'blood libels' fly back and forth, but also the politicians (*i.e.*, they also fly), those who consciously or unconsciously, even if only once, oppose the prescribed opinion. A meritorious former chancellor is mercilessly and mercilessly marginalized by teenage activists and their "correct" rhetoric. The breath of the former conceptual processes runs through the room, because here too the verdict of the trial cannot be questioned. Not only does something like this happen in the West, *it also happens in the declared name of the West*, which has stylized itself over the last five decades as a universe of freedom of expression, of criticism, of plurality, of consideration for all the contingent trifles of insignificant everyday life.

The possibilities of semantics are running out. Decline still means a process, but what is at stake here is no longer a process. It is something that seems to have already

reached its stable endpoint, the *bottom*. It is difficult to envisage how this perversion of language and this corruption of feelings can once again be made good in the future, except by simply saying: 'We can do it!' ("Wir schaffen das!") and there will certainly be some who will actually believe it. The overall situation can hardly be uniformly characterized, because the distance to these events is still extremely small. To talk today about the possible reasons is still very problematic, because the propaganda summarizes these reasons in its own way. Other voices are not publicly possible and theories from globalization to the self-destructive society or from the three-class society to the profit heights of the arms industry do not explain how far this *manichaeian war of annihilation* could break out with such forcibly prescribed passion.

Of course, we are not giving it up, despite the fact is that this war has been planned *for a long time*. *Would this war be possible without Brexit?* Would it be possible, if the English people enjoyed 1000 euros per month (Unconditional Basic Income)?

Conclusion

We know that a world-historical change took place between 2001 and 2003/2004, it is the imperial turn of the globalization of 1989. Even this knowledge, however, is not enough to explain this black reality, which in all its important features is not only the opposite, but also the clear 'withdrawal' of the true spirit of 1989, a withdrawal in the sense that in Thomas Mann's *Doctor Faustus* Beethoven's *Ninth Symphony* was withdrawn. No wonder that not only the party of the present war and its intellectuals, but also a part of the *mainstream* intellectuals, are very reluctant to hear if the spirit of 1989 is still loudly and publicly mentioned and thus removed from oblivion. *The real spirit of 1989, the millennial optimism of an entire planet, is the silent but powerful alternative to this black war*. Our title (The Real Existing Real Reality 2022) goes back to Boris Ponomarev's sentence about the 'real existing socialism', which should have been higher than all 'utopian' concepts. All references to the 'reality' have two directions. In the first case 'reality' is more valuable than utopias (like Ponomarev's). In the second case, the reality is poor and negative compared to the ideas. However, we are actually dealing with a *third* case. 'Reality' becomes for us the highest value, because the simple possession of the definition of *Reality becomes the hidden goal of the present war*. *The Magical Possession of Reality decides*. The one Reality is (the hidden dream of Amerika): the nazification of Russia and the democratic glorification of the Ukraine – charged with Nazism. This is the confirmation of the actual One-Pole-World. The other Reality is the denazification of Ukraine and a real peaceful and multipolar world.

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